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PRE-TRIAL DETENTION OF SUSPECTS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
[Tihe response to an emergency situation by a government is,
essentially, a response in the nature of the legal excuse of self-
defense. "It rests on the concept of necessity. On the one hand
a democratic government is under the obligation to protect the
integrity of the state, while on the other it is under an obligation
to protect human rights. . . . [I]f the measures are not introduced
at the right time the government could easily find itself in a
situation where it has lost control. Equally, there exists the
possibility that, if the measures they resort to are too severe or
abused, the efforts to come to grips with the problem will
exacerbate it. At the end of the day the concept of necessity
involves a choice of the lesser evil . . . ."
Nowhere in the world is the conflict between a government's struggle
to maintain control during an emergency situation and its obligation to
protect human rights more strained than in Northern Ireland.2 Great
Britain has waged in the past, and indeed continues to wage war against
terrorism by implementing stringent policies to combat its spread.
One policy in particular calling for the detention of prisoners for up
to seven days without formally charging them with a crime was recently
struck down in the Brogan Case3 by the European Court of Human Rights
(the "European Court") as violating several provisions of the European
1. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts During
Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1984) (quoting O'Boyle, Emergency
Situations and the Protection of Human Rights: A Modem Derogation Provision For A
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 28 N. IR. LEGAL Q. HUM. RTs. 160 (1977)).
2. Over the last decade Amnesty International has investigated various potential abuses
of human rights by the British government as a result of its efforts to combat terrorism.
See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 143-45 (1980) (denial of visitation rights
and adequate exercise for prisoners); AMNESTY INT'L, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 335-39
(1982) (lack of adequate treatment given to hunger-striking prisoners demanding political
prisoner status); AMNESTY INT'L, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 304-06 (1983) (detention of
prisoners without charge for up to seven days; police interrogation practices; convictions
based on questionable confessions); AMNESTY INT'L, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 314-17 (1987)
(ill-treatment of political suspects during interrogation; Diplock courts); AMNESTY INT'L,
1989 ANNUAL REPORT 241-43 (1990) (unlawful killing of unarmed IRA members in
Gibraltar).
3. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (scr. A) (1988).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the "European Convention").4 The lengthy detention period
was reminiscent of internment, a policy called into question by the Court
in the early 1970s.' Rather than comply with the Court's ruling in the
Brogan Case and dispel any fears that internment was going to be revived
by the British government, the government instead decided to derogate
from the relevant provisions of the European Convention in late 1988.
During this same period, Great Britain introduced a "silence equals guilt"
policy, whereby a detainee's silence during pre-trial questioning could be
used against him as an admission of guilt.
This Note will explore internment briefly as a predecessor to the
Brogan Case, the current Northern Ireland statutory instruments and
international human rights instruments pertaining to the detention of
prisoners, the Brogan Case and Great Britain's subsequent decision not to
follow its mandate and the implications of the "silence equals guilt"
policy. Specifically, this Note will explore whether the policies imple-
mented in the aftermath of the Brogan Case will have the effect of
depriving pre-trial detainees of fundamental human rights and of exacer-
bating rather than alleviating the problem of violence in Northern Ireland.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE "TROUBLES" IN NORTHERN IRELAND
6
Northern Ireland has for four centuries been a province filled with
internal strife and conflict between rival Catholics and Protestants. 7 The
differences between these two groups eventually erupted in 1969 into the
"troubles" as they are commonly called today. 8  At that time, the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association began a civil rights movement
demanding equality for Northern Ireland's Catholic minority.9 They were
protesting for economic, political and social reform, and their non-violent
marches were met with violent attacks by Protestant foes.' ° Terrorist
groups on both sides of the divide, the Provisional Irish Republican Army
4. In force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention],
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (I. Brownlie ed. 1983).
5. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
6. For a detailed background on the history of the Northern Ireland conflict, see Myers,
A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping
Intervention in an Internal Conflict, I I N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9-30 (1990).
7. Hellerstein, McKay & Schlam, Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Northern
Ireland,'43 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 110, 114 (1988).
8. K. KELLEY, THE LONGEST WAR: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE I.R.A. 117 (1988).
9. See K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE 6-26 (1975).
10. Hellerstein, McKay & Schlam, supra note 7, at 114-15.
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(PIRA)"1 on the Catholic side and the Ulster Defense Association
(UDA) 12 on the Protestant side, waged a battle of violence that resulted
in many deaths, most of which were attributable to the PIRA. 13
The police force in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC),' 4 was unable to contain the violence. 5 Subsequently in 1969,
Great Britain decided to send British troops to Northern Ireland to deal
with peacekeeping and security.' 6 Despite the army's presence, the
violence escalated. In 1971, in an attempt to curtail the violence, Great
Britain instituted the policy of internment, which led to the arrest of 1,576
people, 442 of whom were still detained at the end of that year.'
7
Internment, however, did not curb the violence, and the events of 1972
led to the greatest number of deaths in any one year.'8 The most widely
publicized of these events was the "Bloody Sunday" protest during which
thirteen Catholic demonstrators were killed by the British army.'9
No year since 1972 has seen as many casualties, 468 total.' From
1972 to 1988, the number of fatalities recorded annually ranged between
il. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) is a militant faction which branched off from the
Official IRA in 1969. The PIRA attracted more public support in the ghettos than the
Official IRA. The Official IRA had little credibility in the violent summer of 1969. "Falls
Road Catholics complained that it was unable to prevent the burning of Catholic homes.
'IRA-I Ran Away' was scrawled on some walls in W. Belfast." W.D. FLACKES & S.
ELLIOTr, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POLITICAL DIRECTORY, 1968-88, at 227 (1989).
12. The UDA is the largest Protestant paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland,
founded in 1971. Id. at 272.
13. See Hellerstein, McKay & Schlam, supra note 7, at 118-19.
14. In 1979, the size and structure of the RUC was substantially changed. Under the
Police Act (Northern Ireland) of 1970, a Police Authority was established to maintain an
adequate and efficient police force. Operational control of the RUC was vested in the chief
constable. The size of the RUC, which prior to 1970 consisted of 3,500 men and women,
was expanded to deal with new security demands. The force was increased "to 4,940 in
1970, to 6,500 in 1974, to 7,500 in 1979, to 8,000 in 1982, and to 8,250 in 1984. At the
end of 1987 the total strength of the regular force was 8,236 .... " W.D. FLACKES & S.
EuO1r, supra note 11, at 386.
15. See A.C. HEPBURN, CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY IN MODERN IRELAND 185-86
(1980).
16. Id.
17. See Hellerstein, McKay & Schlam, supra note 7, at 121.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Information Service on N. Ir. Conflict & Anglo-Ir. Affairs, Ir. Information
Partnership, Agenda: Summary Table I (Aug. 11, 1989) (extracts from forthcoming
edition).
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a low of fifty-four in 1985 to a high of 297 in 1976.2' Two of the last
five years, however, have seen a sharp increase in the number of
fatalities, the total reaching ninety-three in both 1987 and 1988.22 And
the death toll for the province since 1969 has reached 2,750 individu-
als. 3  These fatalities have occurred despite the signing of the Anglo-
Irish Agreement in 1985' and have prompted Great Britain to adopt
stricter policies to combat the violence, particularly in the treatment of
detained suspects.
III. INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE 1970s
Internment, a policy intended to curb violence, did no such thing.
Instead, it may have exacerbated the problem, and certainly the public
outcry it inspired caused a great deal of embarrassment for Great Britain.
Although Great Britain has not resurrected this questionable policy,
vestiges of internment remain in the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act.' In addition, the recent policies implemented by Great
Britain, namely its decision not to abide by the European Court's mandate
in the Brogan Case and its introduction of a "silence equals guilt" policy,
could be viewed as subtle attempts by the country to avoid internment and
all the baggage associated with it. It remains to be seen, however,
whether these recent policies will, years from now, be viewed as more
draconian than their predecessor in internment.
A. A Brief History of Interwnent
Internment has been defined as "an extra-judicial deprivation of liberty
by executive action."' It involves incarcerating an individual without
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This treaty is also known as the Hillsborough Agreement and was signed by Great
Britain and the Republic of Ireland in November 1985. Treaty on Northern Ireland, Nov.
15, 1985, United Kingdom-Republic of Ireland, 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 62 (Cmnd. 9690).
This agreement provides, inter alia, for joint consultation on such matters as security,
discrimination and injustices in Northern Ireland. Id. arts. 2, 5. For a more detailed
discussion of the terms of this treaty, see Greenspan, Bridging the Irish Sea: The Anglo-
Irish Treaty of 1985, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 585 (1986).
25. For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 77-86 and accompany-
ing text.
26. Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HuM. RTs. 261,
261 (1976).
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charging him with an offense or allowing him access to a trial. 27 In this
way, it is distinguishable from pre-trial detention where a detainee will
eventually be charged and tried in a court of law.28
Although the policy of internment was implemented on a large scale
as recently as 1971 in Northern Ireland, it was not a new policy. The
statutory basis for its implementation was present in the Civil Authority
(Special Powers) Act of 1922 (the "SPA")," passed by the now defunct
Northern Ireland parliament. SPA regulation 12 authorized the home
affairs minister to issue an internment order against anyone who was
suspected of having acted, or about to act, in a manner prejudicial to
preserving peace and maintaining order in Northern Ireland.' Under the
SPA, the Northern Irish government interned 500 members of the Sinn
F6in party in 1922. 31 For the next two years, the government interned
members of the IRA.32 It was not used again until 1938 when 827 men
were interned for an alleged conspiracy against the government.33 From
that time until 1956, internment was implemented sporadically.' Shortly
thereafter, it was resurrected and used to combat an IRA offensive, but
internment remained little used until its widespread resurgence in 1971.
B. Intermnent Between 1971-75
In August of 1971, the then minister of home affairs, Brian Faulkner,
re-introduced the policy of internment under regulation 12 of the SPA in
order to counter the guerilla campaign being waged by the PIRA.3
Between August 1971 and February 1972, 2,447 people were arrested.37
A large number of the individuals arrested early on in this period were not
members of the IRA, but civil rights activists, socialists, intellectuals and
students who had become politicized by the civil rights movement.3"
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Spjut, Internment and Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975:
Ministerial Policy and Practice, 49 MOD. L. REv. 712-13 (1986).
30. Id. at 713.
31. See Lowry, supra note 26, at 273.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 274.
36. See Spjut, supra note 29, at 715-16.
37. Id.
38. See Lowry, supra note 26, at 276.
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Indeed, the Diplock Commission, in examining these early arrests,
conceded that a number of them were based on inadequate and inaccurate
information.39 A large number of prisoners were released and only 809
were still being held at the end of 1975. 0
When the Emergency Protection Act was enacted in 1972 to replace
the SPA, it conferred upon the secretary of state of Northern Ireland the
power to introduce the Detention of Terrorists Order to control intern-
ments in place of the provisions for internment in the SPA.41 The order
provided the following: that a detainee would be served with an interim
custody order which allowed for detention of up to twenty-eight days, and
that within that time period the chief constable could refer the case to a
commissioner (a United Kingdom lawyer of ten years standing) to
determine if (a) the suspect had been involved in the commission or
attempted commission of a terrorist act; and if (b) the suspect's detention
was necessary for the protection of the public.42 Terrorism was defined
as the use of violence for political ends, including the use of violence
designed to put the public in fear. 3 Significantly, the order was silent as
to the weight of evidence' needed to determine that the public should be
protected from the suspect." Furthermore, the commissioner had the
power to extend the twenty-eight day period indefinitely if he felt that the
suspect was a threat to the public.45
Between 1972 and 1975, thousands of people were arrested, and
approximately 1,200 were interned as suspected terrorists.' These
prisoners were released sporadically after being detained for varying
periods of time before the policy was eventually phased out in '1975. 47
C. Ireland v. United Kingdom
Great Britain's treatment of interned prisoners in the early 1970s was
formally called into question before the European Commission on Human
Rights (the "European Commission") by the Republic of Ireland and
39. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH
TERRORIST ACTIvrnIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, CMND. No. 5185, para. 32, at 15
[hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].
40. See Spjut, supra note 29, at 740.
41. See Lowry, supra note 26, at 292-93.
42. Id. at 293.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Spjut, supra note 29, at 740.
47. See Lowry, supra note 26, at 274-75.
[Vol. I I
PRE-TRLAL DETENTION OF SUSPECTS
subsequently was referred by the commission to the European Court.48
Ireland filed an inter-state application in accordance with article 24 of the
European Convention. 9 Ireland submitted that internment constituted a
violation of articles 1, 3, 5, 6 and 14 of the convention. I Specifically,
Ireland alleged that the British government acquiesced in the use of
brutality and torture during the interrogation of detainees. 1 The detainees
were apparently subjected to five "disorientation" or "sensory depriva-
tion" techniques consisting of:
(1) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for
periods of some hours in a "stress position," de-
scribed by those who underwent it as being "spread-
eagled against the wall, with their fingers put high
above the head against the wall, the legs spread
apart and feet back, causing them to stand on their
toes with the weight of the body mainly on the
fingers";
(2) hooding: putting a black bag over the detainee's
head and, at least initially, keeping it there all the
time except during interrogation;
(3) subjection to noise: holding the detainees in a room
48. Although not as publicized as Ireland v. United Kingdom, several prisoners brought
individual suits against the United Kingdom in English courts regarding internment. These
cases point out the various problems detainees encountered and the types of damages they
were able to recover on the domestic front. In Moore v. Shillington, the plaintiff internee
succeeded in a civil action for damages for assault during the period of his detention and
wrongful arrest. Moore v. Shillington; Moore v. Ministry of Home Aff. for N. Ir., [1972]
N. Ir. 190 (Q.B.D.). The trial judge awarded the maximum damages and was particularly
critical of the oppressive circumstances in which internees were held. Id. In In re
McElduff, the plaintiff had been told upon his arrest that he was being apprehended under
the SPA without any explanation of the charges against him. [1972] N. Ir. 1 (Q.B.D.).
He sued for false imprisonment and was awarded damages. Id. In In re Mackey, the
plaintiff claimed that he was not allowed legal representation before the Advisory
Committee to the Minister of Home Affairs, in accordance with regulation 12 of the SPA.
[1971] N.I.J.B. 1 (Q.B.D.). The court held that a detainee has the prior right to relevant
facts in order to be able to rebut the allegation of suspicion. Id.
49. Rauch, The Compatibility of the Detention of Terrorists Order (Northern Ireland)
with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 1 (1973).
50. Id.
51. Quigley, Humanitarian Intervention: A Possibility for Northern Ireland, 12 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 295, 301 (1983).
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where there was a continuous loud and hissing tone,
while awaiting interrogation;
(4) deprivation of sleep: depriving the detainees of sleep
pending their interrogation; and
(5) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detain-
ees to a reduced diet during their stay at the prison
and pending interrogation. 2
In the proceedings in Ireland v. United Kingdom before the European
Court,53 Great Britain admitted that these techniques had been authorized
at a high level, although no specific names were given.' In March 1972,
the British prime minister announced a discontinuance of the five
techniques, and damages were paid to the victims as a form of settle-
ment.55 None of them subsequently brought a suit in a British court of
law. -
The European Court held that although the techniques amounted to
inhuman and degrading treatment under article 3, they did not rise to the
level of intensity and cruelty implicit in the word "torture."57 In
addition, the Court ruled that it had no power to institute criminal or
disciplinary proceedings against the members of the security forces
responsible for the breaches of article 3 or others who might have
condoned the use of the five techniques.5"
Presumably, Great Britain will never again allow such techniques to
be used to elicit confessions from detainees. The longer a detainee is
held, however, the greater the risk of pressure to obtain information
exists.
IV. THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR
DETAINING SUSPECTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Great Britain is currently trying to combat the ongoing violence in
Northern Ireland with stringent policies concerning the detention of
52. Id. at n.35.
53. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
54. Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol I and its Relation To Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 9,
17 (1983).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 18.
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persons suspected of having engaged in terrorist activities in Northern
Ireland. Two major statutory instruments provide Great Britain with the
power to detain suspects before formal charges are brought against them:
(1) the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1987 (the
"EPA")59; and (2) the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act of 1989' (the "PTA").
Great Britain does not have a domestic "Bill of Rights" per se,
designed to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens. Great Britain,
however, is a signatory to several international human rights agreements
which provide a check on the provisions of its domestic statutes and
thereby protect the liberty interests of its citizens. These international
agreements include the European Convention," as well as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (the "Universal Declaration")62 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "International
Covenant").'
59. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987 [hereinafter EPA of 1987].
This Act amended the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978. The 1978
Act consolidated parts of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973
[hereinafter EPA of 1973] and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment)
Act of 1975 and the whole of the Northern Ireland (Young Persons) Act of 1974 and the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act of 1977. The relevant
provisions dealing with detention of suspects originated in schedule I of the EPA of 1973
and remain in effect today.
60. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989 [hereinafter PTA of
1989]. This version of the PTA was brought forward in 1988. At that time, the British
government determined that the legislation should no longer be limited to five years, but
instead, should achieve greater permanence. The government, however, rejected the idea
of dropping annual renewal of the PTA by Parliament. W.D. FLACKES & S. ELUOTr,
supra note 10, at 97. The PTA of 1989 amended the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act of 1984 [hereinafter PTA of 1984]. The relevant provisions dealing with
detention of suspects, found in section 12 of the PTA of 1984, were not affected by the
1989 amendment and remain in force today.
61. European Convention, supra note 4.
62. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAORat71, U.N.
Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 250. The Universal Declaration was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. It is not an international treaty and does
not create binding obligations on the countries that adhere to it. Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN
RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 36 (1978).
63. Inforce Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) and in
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 270 [hereinafter International
Covenant]. The International Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1966 and came into force in 1976. Z. NEDJATI, supra note 62, at 38.
It allows for a state party to make an inter-state application to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee alleging that another party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
19901
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The relevant provisions of Great Britain's domestic statutes pertaining
to the pre-trial detention of suspects and the corresponding provisions of
the foregoing international human rights agreements bearing on this issue
are set forth below.
A. Northern Ireland Statutory Instruments
Both the PTA and the EPA contain independent provisions for the
detention of persons suspected of having engaged in terrorist activity:
"detention upon arrest" under the PTA and "extra-judicial detention"
under the EPA.' The PTA policy of "detention upon arrest" arises out
of the police powers to arrest given to the RUC.' In contrast, the EPA
policy of "extra-judicial detention" begins with the issuance of an interim
custody order by the secretary of state of Northern Ireland.' After such
an order has been issued, the constable of the RUC becomes involved in
the adjudication process for a detainee.67 The following discussion sets
forth the principles embodied in these policies.
1. Detention Upon Arrest Under the PTA
Section 12(l)(b) of the PTA provides that a constable may arrest
without warrant, "a person who is or has been concerned in the commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism . "..."68 Terrorism
is defined in section 14(1) to be "the use of violence for political ends,
and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public . . .
in fear."' Section 12(4) of the PTA provides, "a person arrested under
this section shall not be detained in right of the arrest for more thanforty-
eight hours after his arrest, but the Secretary of State may, in any
particular case, extend the period of forty-eight hours by a period or
periods specified by him. "' The maximum extension permissible is five
days from the end of the initial forty-eight hours, seven days total.7"
covenant. Id. at 39. The covenant also allows for the submission of individual applications
to the committee provided that the same matter is not, or never has been, under
consideration by the European Commission. Id.
64. See PTA of 1984, supra note 60, § 12.
65. See Hellerstein, McKay & Sehlam, supra note 7, at 132.
66. EPA of 1973, supra note 59, sched. 1.
67. Id.
68. PTA of 1984, supra note 60, § 12(b).
69. Id. § 14(1).
70. Id. § 12(4) (emphasis added).
71. Id. § 12(l)(a).
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The PTA applies to the entire United Kingdom, however, section 12
is used to detain suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland more frequently
than other countries in the United Kingdom. 2  In Northern Ireland in
1986, 1,309 persons were detained under the section, 483 extensions73
were granted and 358 persons were eventually charged with offenses.74
In the first six months of 1987, 659 persons were detained, 147 extensions
were granted and 155 persons were eventually charged. 75
In contrast, in Great Britain in 1986, 202 persons were detained under
section 12, fifty-seven extensions were granted and thirty-six persons were
eventually charged with offenses. In the first six months of 1987, 127
persons were detained, thirty-one extensions were granted and thirteen
persons were eventually charged.76
2. Extra-judicial Detention Under the EPA
The provision for extra-judicial detention has existed in schedule I of
the EPA since 1973." It has not been implemented since 1975 when
internment was disbanded. 78 Lord Diplock attempted to "distinguish" this
form of detention from internment in the following way:
Deprivation of liberty [is] a result of an extra-judicial process we call
"detention," following the nomenclature of The Detention of
Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, 1972. It does not mean
imprisonment at the arbitrary Diktat of the Executive Government,
which to many people is a common connotation of the term "intern-
ment." We use it to describe depriving a man of his liberty as a
result of an investigation of the facts which inculpate the detainee by
an impartial person or tribunal . . ..
72. REvIEw OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS) ACT 1984, 1987, CMND. No. 264, at 14 [hereinafter COLVILLE REPORT].
73. The reasons for granting extensions include: the checking of fingerprints; forensic
tests; checking the detainee's replies against intelligence; new lines of inquiry; interrogation
to identify accomplices; correlating information obtained from one or more than one other
detainee in the same case; finding and consulting another witness; identification parades;
checking an alibi; translating documents; obtaining an interpreter and then carrying on the
necessary interviews with his assistance; communications with foreign police forces,
sometimes across time-zone and language difficulties; and evaluation of documents once
translated and further investigated. Id. at 13-14.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 68.
77. See EPA of 1973, supra note 59, sched. I.
78. See Lowry, supra note 26, at 274-75.
79. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 39, para. 28, at 14.
1990]
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Lord Diplock's attempted distinction could be interpreted in the
following manner: if extra-judicial detention were implemented today, an
inquiry would be made into the allegations against a suspected terrorist
within twenty-eight days after he is brought into custody, whereas when
internment was implemented in the 1970s, hundreds of people were
arrested and remained in custody without prompt inquiries (if any were
made at all) as to the nature of the allegations against them. In addition,
a number of the internees in the 1970s were subjected to inhumane
treatment and even torture.
In reality, extra-judicial detention is no different from internment
because no time period is specified for a prisoner's release. Under
schedule I of the EPA, the secretary of state can make an interim custody
order for the "temporary" detention of a person.' Within twenty-eight
days, there must be a reference by the chief constable of the RUC to a
commissioner for adjudication in private to determine whether the suspect
had been engaged in acts of terrorism and whether his detention was
necessary for the protection of the public."' If these requirements are
met, the suspect may be detained (for an unlimited period of time);'
otherwise, the suspect must be released.'
Although a detention order has not been issued since 1975, some
proponents argue that extra-judicial detention should be retained in the
EPA in case matters get worse in Northern Ireland, justifying its use.'
Other commentators have termed extra-judicial detention to be a source of
embarrassment for Great Britain 5 and call for it to be stricken from the
EPA altogether."
B. International Hunan Rights Agreements
Unlike the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant and the
European Convention create legally binding obligations on member
states.8 7 Although many of the provisions of the International Covenant
and the European Convention are similar, this summary will focus on the
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Hellerstein, McKay & Schlam, supra note 7, at 134.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 194; see REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, 1975, CMND. 5847, at 55 [hereinafter GARDINER REPORT].
87. Z. NEDJATI, supra note 62, at 1, 38.
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European Convention, the instrument called upon for redress of human
rights violations in the Brogan Case.88
The European Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in
1950 and came into force in 19 5 3  Some of the rights guaranteed by the
convention which affect prisoners include, inter alia, the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to liberty and
security of person, the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy
before a national authority.'
The convention establishes three bodies that are responsible for
protecting the rights guaranteed by it: the European Commission, the
European Court and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe.9 The European Commission is vested with the authority to
receive inter-state as well as individual applications alleging violations of
the convention. 2 It has twenty members, one from each convention
country, and it holds five sessions per year."
The commission renders an opinion whether the facts alleged in a
given application constitute a breach of the convention.' Within three
months time, the commission may refer the case to the Committee of
Ministers for a decision.95 If the committee decides by a two-thirds
majority that there has been a violation of the convention, it must
prescribe a period during which the state in question must take remedial
measures.
96
The commission may also refer the case to the European Court for a
decision. 97 The Court is composed of nineteen judges representing the
member states of the Council of Europe.98 The Court, by a majority,
renders final judgments which are binding on the states concerned.' The
execution of these judgments is supervised by the Committee of Minis-
ters." Hence, a complete framework is set up by the convention for
88. See infra notes 124-58 and accompanying text.
89. Z. NEDJATI, supra note 62, at I.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. id.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id.
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the redress of human rights violations.
One such human rights violation which was brought to the European
Commission's and the European Court's attention was Great Britain's
policy of detaining suspects for up to seven days, under section 12 of the
PTA. As the following discussion of this case elucidates, the European
Court did not feel that a government's effort, however legitimate to.
combat the threat of terrorism in itself, justifies abridging a detainee's
fundamental rights, as guaranteed in the European Convention.
V. THE BROGAN CASE
The Brogan Case' originated with four separate applications for
relief by the European Commission filed in 1984 and 1985."02 The
commission subsequently joined the claims, and after hearing the case, it
determined in May 19 87 "r3 that there had been breaches of article 5(3)
and article 5(5) regarding the treatment of two of the four prisoners; no
breaches of article 5(4), article 5(5) and article 13 occurred."° In July
1987, the commission brought the case before the European Court, which
subsequently rendered its opinion in November 1988.'
A. Factual Background
All four prisoners (Dermot Coyle, Terence Brogan, William
McFadden and Michael Tracey) were arrested in 1984 on different
occasions in their homes.ia' In each case, the prisoners "were informed
by the arresting officer that they were being arrested under section 12 of
the PTA and that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting them to
have been involved in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts
of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland."'O7 In each
case, the decision to extend the period of detention for a further five days
was made by the secretary of state for Northern Ireland in accordance
with section 12 of the PTA. 08
101. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (scr. A) (1988).
102. Id. at 26.
103. The full text of the European Commission's decision is printed as an annex to the
European Court's decision. See id. at 58-70.
104. Id. at 26.
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 19-20.
107. Id. at 20-21.
108. Id. at 21.
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Terence Brogan was arrested on September 17, 1984 under section 12
of the PTA."°9 He was questioned about his suspected involvement in
a police attack, as a result of which a police sergeant was killed and
another officer was seriously injured.' 10 Brogan was also interrogated
about his suspected involvement in the PIRA."' Brogan's detention
lasted five days and eleven hours, during which time he remained silent
and refused to answer any questions addressed to him." 2
Dermot Coyle was arrested on October 1, 1984 under section 12 of
the PTA." 3 Coyle was questioned about his suspected involvement in
the planting of a land-mine aimed at killing members of the security forces
and a blast incendiary bomb attack." 4  Coyle, too, was interrogated
about his suspected membership in the PIRA; he too remained silent. "'
In all, Coyle's detention lasted six days and sixteen and a half hours.1 ' 6
William McFadden was arrested on October 1, 1984 under section 12
of the PTA." 7 He was questioned about his suspected involvement in
the murders of two soldiers and his suspected membership in the
PIRA." 8 With the exception of answering a few general questions,
McFadden remained silent." 9 He was detained for four days and sixhours. 120
Michael Tracey was arrested on October 1, 1984 under section 12 of
the PTA. He was questioned about two armed robberies of post offices
and a murder conspiracy.'' Like McFadden, Tracey only answered
questions of a general nature." 2 Tracey's detention lasted four days and
eleven hours. '3
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 20.
1.18. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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B. The Alleged Violations of the European Convention
Brogan, Coyle, Tracey and McFadden (collectively referred to as "the
applicants") alleged that their arrests were contrary to various provisions
of the European Convention, the most significant substantively being
articles 5(I)(c), 5(3), 5(4) and 5(5). Each of these allegations, the British
government's response and the European Court's ruling are discussed
seriatim.
1. Alleged Violations of Article 5(1)(c)
Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention provides:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of persons. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence .... 124
The applicants did not dispute that each arrest and detention was
"lawful" under Northern Ireland law." Instead, they argued that their
arrest and detention was grounded "not of having committed a specific
offence, but rather of involvement in unspecified acts of terrorism ...
which -did not constitute a breach of the criminal law in Northern Ireland
and could not be regarded as an 'offence' under Article 5 § 1(c)." 1
The British government argued that the applicants were not "suspected
of involvement in terrorism in general, but of membership of a proscribed
organisation and involvement in specific acts of terrorism, each of which
constituted an offence under the law of Northern Ireland and each of
which was expressly put to the applicants during the course of their
interviews . "27
The European Court pointed out that section 14 of the PTA defines
terrorism as "'the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public
. .. in fear."' 2 The Court added that this same definition appeared in
124. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. l(c) (emphasis added).
125. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 28-29.
128. Id. at 29 (quoting section 14 of the PTA, supra note 60).
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the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order of 1972 and the EPA
of 1973, which the Court previously held in Ireland v. United Kingdom
to be "well in keeping with the idea of an offence."" 2 Thus, the Court
held, by a vote of sixteen to three," 3 that no violation occurred because
the arrests and subsequent detentions of the applicants were based on a
reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence in accordance with
article 5(l)(c).1'3
The applicants also alleged a separate violation of another phrase in
article 5(1)(c). Specifically, they argued that they were not arrested and
detained for the purpose of bringing them before a competent legal
authority in accordance with article 5(1)(c). 32
The British government rebutted this contention by stating that the
necessary intent was present and that if sufficient evidence had been
obtained during the course of the police investigation following their
arrest, all four suspects would have been charged with a crime and
eventually brought to trial. 33 The applicants rejoined by referring to the
fact that they were never charged or brought before a court during their
detention.
The European Court held, by a vote of sixteen to three,'34 that no
violation of article 5(1)(c) occurred because the fact that the prisoners
"were neither charged nor brought before a court does not necessarily
mean that the purpose of their detention was not in accordance with
Article 5 § l(c). " 3S Under the circumstances of the case, the Court
found no reason to believe that the police investigations were not carried
out in good faith or that the detention of the prisoners was not done in
furtherance of the investigations.'36
2. Alleged Violation of Article 5(3)
Article 5(3) of the European Convention provides:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph l(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before
a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial po-
129. Id. (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 75 (ser. A) (1978)).
130. Id. at 37.
131. Id. at 29.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 37.
135. Id. at 29.
136. Id. at 30.
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wer and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guaranties
to appear for trial.'37
The applicants argued that a person arrested under the ordinary law
of Northern Ireland must be brought before a Magistrate's Court within
forty-eight hours, and under the ordinary law of England and Wales, the
maximum detention period permissible without a formal charge is four
days. 13
8
The British government attempted to refute this argument by stressing
that the seven-day maximum period of statutory detention under the PTA
was an indispensable part of the government's efforts to combat terrorism
and the resulting problems it creates in obtaining evidence sufficient to
bring charges against suspects.
139
The European Court identified the issue to be decided as whether each
suspect's release could be considered "prompt" within the meaning of
article 5 (3 ).1"° The Court pointed out that this particular provision of
the European Convention
enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the
individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his right
to liberty .... Judicial control of interferences by the executive
with the individual's right to liberty is an essential of the guaran-
tee embodied in Article 5 § 3, which is intended to minimise the
risk of arbitrariness. Judicial control is implied by the rule of
law, "one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society
. . .which is expressly referred to in the Preamble to the
Convention" . . . and "from which the whole Convention draws
its inspiration." 141
Given the importance of this provision, the Court determined that the
notion of "promptness" should be interpreted in a very limited way. 142
The Court held, by twelve votes to seven, 14 3 that
137. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 3.
138. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 33.
143. Id. at 37.
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even the shortest of the four periods of detention, namely the four
days and six hours spent in police custody by Mr. McFadden...
falls outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by the first
part of Article 5 § 3 . . . The undoubted fact that the arrest and
detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of
protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its
own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific require-
ments of Article 5 § 3.'4
3. Alleged Violation of Article 5(4)
Article 5(4) of the European Convention provides:
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of
his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release
ordered if the detention is not lawful. 145
The applicants argued that because article 5 had not been incorporated
into United Kingdom law, an effective review of the lawfulness of their
detention as contemplated under article 5(4) was precluded in the United
Kingdom. 1'
The British government took the position that because the remedy of
habeas corpus' was available to the applicants under Northern Ireland law,
although they did not avail themselves of it, the requirements of article
5(4) were met.' 7
The European Court held unanimously 14 that in accordance with
article 5(4)
the applicants should have had available to them a remedy
allowing the competent court to examine not only compliance
with the procedural requirements set out in section 12 of the
[PTA] but also the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the
arrest and the legitimacy of the purpose pursued by the arrest and
the ensuing detention.
144. Id. at 34.
145. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 4.
146. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 34.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 37.
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As is shown by the relevant case-law . . . these conditions are
met in the practice of Northern Ireland courts in relation to the
remedy of habeas corpus. 149
4. Alleged Violation of Article 5(5)
Article 5(5) of the European Convention provides: "Everyone who has
been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of
[article 5] shall have an enforceable right to compensation.""
The applicants argued that a claim for compensation for unlawful
deprivation of liberty may be lodged in the United Kingdom for a breach
of the domestic law, such as false imprisonment;' however, because
article 5 of the European Convention is not incorporated into the domestic
law, no claim for compensation lies for a breach of article 5 which does
not also constitute a breach of United Kingdom law. 52
The British government responded that article 5(5) is aimed at
ensuring that the victim of an "unlawful" arrest or detention is given just
compensation; the applicants' detention was "lawful" in accordance with
various paragraphs of article 5, therefore, no enforceable right to
compensation exists.'53
The European Court held, by thirteen votes to six,"5 that such a
restrictive interpretation is incompatible with the terms of article 5(5)
which applies to arrest or detention "in contravention of the provisions"
of article 5."'
The European Court's decision in the Brogan Case is significant in
several respects. The Court adopted a narrower view of the concept of
"prompt release" of a suspect under article 5(3) of the European
Convention than the European Commission has taken in its opinion. The
commission held that this standard was violated regarding only two of the
four suspects, Brogan and Coyle, who were detained for five days and
eleven hours and six days and sixteen and a half hours, respectively.'6
149. Id. at 34-35.
150. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 5.
151. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 37.
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id. at 26.
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The Court, on the other hand, held that all four prisoners were not
released promptly, including McFadden and Tracey, who were detained
for four days and six hours and four days and eleven hours, respective-
ly. 117 In so doing, the Court tipped the scale of justice in favor of
protecting individual rights when it held that the "fact that the arrest and
detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of
protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own
sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of Article
5 § 3."158
However carefully the European Court endeavored to protect the
fundamental rights of detained suspects, its efforts were soon thwarted by
the policies implemented by Great Britain in late 1988 and thereafter.
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BROGAN CASE
A. Great Britain's Derogation from the European Convention
Article 15(1) of the European Convention provides for derogation "in
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
. . . to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law."159 Article 15(3) also requires that the party
derogating keep the secretary-general of the Council of Europe fully
informed of the measures it has taken and the reasons therefor, and when
those measures have ceased to operate so as to place the convention in full
force again. 1°
In Ireland v. The United Kingdom, the European Court stated:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its
responsibility for the "life of (its) nation," to determine whether
that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how
far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency.
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing
needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in
a better position than the international judge to decide both on the
presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15§(1)
leaves those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.
157. Id. at 33.
158. Id. at 34.
159. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 15, para. I.
160. Id. art. 15, para. 3.
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Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this
respect. The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible
for ensuring the observance of the State's engagements (Article
19), is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone
beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
crisis. . . . The domestic margin of appreciation is thus accompa-
nied by a European supervision." 161
Great Britain was obliged to comply with the European Court's ruling
in the Brogan Case within six months, in accordance with its obligations
as a signatory to the European Convention. 62 Great Britain had violated
the convention in twenty-one other cases and always complied with the
Court's ruling.163 Shortly after the Court issued its decision in Brogan,
however, the British Parliament debated whether to comply with the
Court's ruling and amend the PTA accordingly, or alternatively to obtain
an article 15 derogation from the relevant portions of the European
Convention in question." On December 24, 1988, the British govern-
ment publicly announced its decision not to comply with the Court's
ruling." 5 The home secretary, Douglas Hurd, informed Parliament that
Great Britain would derogate from the applicable sections of the conven-
tion in question until it decided what its final policy would be. 1"5 Hurd
stated, "It remains our wish to find a judicial route through this problem
if this can be achieved."167 He added that because of the threat of
terrorism in Northern Ireland, the police needed to detain suspects for up
to seven days in some instances.'
One year later, the position of Great Britain did not change. In
December 1989, the British government decided to affirm its 1988
decision to derogate from the European Convention."W Mr. Wadding-
ton, a member of Parliament, stated of this decision:
161. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 78-79 (ser. A) (1978) (citations omitted).
162. Id.; see also supra notes 89-100.
163. Whitney, British Detention Law is Ruled a Breach of Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov.
30, 1988, at A19, col. 1.
164. 143 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 207, 232-236 (1988).
165. See Whitney, Britain, Citing Terrorism, Keeps Detention, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,
1988, at A4, col. 1.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See 160 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 209-10 (1989) (statement of Mr. Wadding-
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Since the [Clourt delivered its judgment on 29 November 1988
the Government have been considering whether it would be
possible to introduce a judicial element in the procedure for
authorising extensions of detention in a way which would be
compatible with the provisions of the [C]onvention and which
would not weaken its effectiveness. The Government believe that
in the context of the continued threat to the United Kingdom, on
a scale unknown elsewhere in Europe, posed by terrorism
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland the power to hold
terrorist suspects for a period of up to seven [days] is essen-
tial.' 70
The Council of Europe's decision to grant Great Britain's request for
a derogation is incongruous given the specific holding by the European
Court in the Brogan Case. The Court stressed that the threat of terrorism
on the whole community by itself is not enough to support an abridgement
of fundamental human rights.171 Yet, the threat of terrorism alone
seems to be the reason articulated by Mr. Waddington for Great Britain's
need for a derogation. This threat was well known to the European Court
when it rendered its decision in November 1988, yet one month later this
same threat was deemed sufficient by the Council of Europe to justify
Great Britain's derogation. The end result is that the Brogan Case, for all
its impact on the fundamental rights of detained suspects in Northern
Ireland, will remain an unenforced judgment, suspended temporarily in
limbo, or perhaps even permanently.
B. The "Silence Equals Guilt" Policy
In his report on the operation of the PTA, Lord Colville stated that
proper checks and procedures designed to protect the detainees and police
alike from abuse "solve nothing if the detainee is trained to say noth-
ing."" 7 He added that
[t]errorist training manuals now contain detailed techniques
whereby a person under interrogation may devote his mind to
something which enables him to resist the temptation to answer
even the most innocent sounding question . . . . It is not a
demonstrable argument to support seven days [detention] as op-
170. Id.
171. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
172. COLviLE REPORT, supra note 72, at 13.
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posed to five days. There now seems to be no particular period
which amounts to the threshold of resistance to questioning.'7
On October 20, 1988, the British government announced its desire to
introduce a "silence equals guilt" policy for Northern Ireland,' 74
whereby a detained suspect's silence during an interrogation or a
defendant's silence during a trial could be used against him as an
admission of guilt.'" It was touted as likely to pass a vote in Parliament
due to Margaret Thatcher's support by the majority.1 76 Shortly after its
announcement, the proposal sparked a great deal of criticism. In fact, an
editorial in the New York Times said the following of Margaret Thatcher:
When she is right, nobody is more fiercely impressive than
Margaret Thatcher. And when Britain's Prime Minister is
wrong, her zeal compounds the damage and embarrassment.
Now she is spectacularly wrong with . . . a proposal allowing a
criminal defendant's silence to weigh as evidence against him.
• . . Britain's good name as mother of parliaments and seedbed
of political freedom is an asset more precious than the crown
jewels. How bizarre for it to be tarnished by a Conservative
Government.' 77
The "silence equals guilt" policy, despite its criticism from the world
at large, did pass a vote by Parliament and became the Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order of 1988 (the "1988 Order"). 78 With regard
to the detention of suspects, before formal charges are filed, article 3 of
the 1988 Order provides:
(1) Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence,
evidence is given that the accused-
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence,
on being questioned by a constable trying to discover
whether or by whom the offence had been commit-
ted, failed to mention any fact relied on in his de-
fence in those proceedings;
173. Id.
174. See Whitney, Britain Moves to Limit Right of Silence For Ulster Terrorist Suspects,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at A20, col. 3.
175. Id.; see Britain Seeks To Deny 'Right Of Silence' in N.L, Ir. Echo (New York
City), Oct. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
176. Britain Seeks To Deny 'Right Of Silence' in N. L, supra note 175, at 11.
177. Mrs. Thatcher's Muzzle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1988, at A30, col. I (editorial).
178. Criminal Evidence (N. Ir.) Order, 1988.
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[such fact] being a fact which in the circumstances
existing at the time the accused could reasonably
have been expected to mention when so ques-
tioned, charged or informed, as the case may be,
paragraph 2 applies.
(2) Where this paragraph applies-
(a) the court in determining whether to commit the
accused for trial or whether there is a case to answer;
may-
(i) draw such inferences from the failure as appear
proper;
(ii) on the basis of such inferences treat the failure
as, or as capable of amounting to corroboration of
any evidence given against the accused in relation
to which the failure is material.' 79
The "silence equals guilt" order is extremely problematic and, if
challenged in an international court, may prove to be a more egregious
violation of fundamental rights than the prolonged detention period called
into question in the Brogan Case. Three international agreements, the
Universal Declaration, the European Convention and the International
Covenant, contain clauses which provide for the presumption of innocence
of the accused until proven guilty in a court of law."° Furthermore, the
International Covenant specifically provides that the accused shall "[n]ot
be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt."'
Until it is called into question under these agreements and eventually
struck down, the "silence equals guilt" policy could ostensibly solve the
problem that Lord Colville saw with the current debate over the proper
179. Id. art. 3.
180. See Universal Declaration, supra note 62, art. 11, para. 1 ("Everyone charged
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law in public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.");
European Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 2 ("Everyone charged with a criminal
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."); International
Covenant, supra note 63, art. 14, para. 2 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.").
181. International Covenant, supra note 63, art. 14, para. 3(g).
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length of time to detain a suspect under the PTA before formally charging
him with a crime or releasing him. When a confession is not forthcom-
ing, a prisoner silence will automatically serve as an inference of guilt; the
pre-trial detention period ceases at the moment of silence. Given the
arbitrary nature of the 1988 Order, a constable could ostensibly rely on
silence as sufficient evidence to charge a suspect with a crime.
Furthermore, the 1988 Order greatly reduces the chances of Great
Britain calling upon the policy of internment or "extra-judicial detention"
under the EPA to combat the threat of terrorism. Extended periods of
detention and interrogation where inhuman treatment could take place
would not occur. As soon as a prisoner remains silent, his new status as
a charged prisoner could ostensibly begin.
VII. CONCLUSION
Great Britain has, in the past, responded to the volatile situation in
Northern Ireland through the added use of force and restrictive policies in
an effort to combat terrorism. International tribunals in dealing with these
policies have attempted to strike a balance between the rights of the
individual and a community under siege and have sometimes found that
Great Britain's policies were too severe. Despite these policies, Great
Britain's effort to squelch terrorism did not succeed.
The current wave of terrorist violence has prompted Great Britain to
respond exactly as it did in the past. It is introducing new and even more
questionable policies aimed at combating terrorism. It remains to be seen,
however, how the scales of justice will tip regarding these policies. In all
likelihood, the European Court will not allow Great Britain to remain
unchecked in abridging fundamental human rights during the current
"emergency" situation of increased violence.
The greater question remains whether these policies will backfire.
Great Britain is enacting "temporary" policies for Northern Ireland to deal
with the "emergency" situation. Most people lose sight of the fact that the
"emergency" has lasted for over twenty years. The "temporary" policies
Great Britain has continued to enact, some of which violate fundamental
human rights, have really become the permanent law of the land in
Northern Ireland. As a result, this permanent law is being matched by a
permanent and growing resistance from terrorist organizations. Conse-
quently, all eyes will be fixed on Great Britain to see if the British
government's latest endeavors to combat terrorism will have the effect of
exacerbating, rather than alleviating the violence in Northern Ireland.
After a twenty-one year pattern with little success, perhaps the time has
come to find new ways of curing Northern Ireland's "troubles."
Kerry S. Sullivan
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